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Several hundred research groups attempted replications of published effects in so-called
Many Labs studies involving thousands of research participants. Given this enormous invest-
ment, it seems timely to assess what has been learned and what can be learned from this
type of project. My evaluation addresses four questions: First, do these replication studies
inform us about the replicability of social psychological research? Second, can replications
detect fraud? Third, does the failure to replicate a finding indicate that the original result
was wrong? Finally, do these replications help to support or disprove any social psycho-
logical theories? Although evidence of replication failures resulted in important methodo-
logical changes, the 2015 Open Science Collaboration findings sufficed to make the point.
To assess the state of social psychology, we have to evaluate theories rather than randomly
selected research findings.
What can we learn from many labs
replications?
For the last few years, social psychology has been in a
crisis of confidence, brought about by a loss of trust in
the reproducibility of research findings. The first event
that gave rise to these doubts was the fraud case involv-
ing Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel. He was
one of the young stars of European social psychology
until it was discovered in 2011 that more than 50 of his
publications had been based on invented data (Levelt
et al., 2012; Stroebe, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). This
widely publicized case, which harmed the image of
social psychology in the eye of the public, was soon fol-
lowed by findings of an apparently high prevalence of
questionable research practices (e.g., John, Loewenstein,
& Prelec, 2012; but see also Fiedler & Schwarz, 2016).
At the same time, there were reports of failures to repli-
cate high-profile priming studies; probably most publi-
cized was Doyen, Klein, Pichon, and Cleeremans’s
(2012) nonreplication of the iconic study of Bargh,
Chen, and Burrows (1996). Bargh and colleagues had
reported that priming individuals with elderly primes
slowed down their walking speed. Even though these
events had already received more publicity than one
would expect from an internal dispute within a scien-
tific discipline, the press coverage became frantic after
an open letter by Nobel Laureate Kahnemann, in which
he warned young social psychologists not to engage in
work on priming (Yong, 2012). These doubts motivated
numerous research groups to engage in collaborative,
large-scale, and highly powered (above .80) replication
projects. These projects attempted exact and preregis-
tered replications of the original studies with the aim
to provide empirical estimates of the extent to
which (social-) psychological research findings could
be replicated.
The first and largest of these projects was the Open
Science Collaboration (OSC; 2015), a collaborative effort
that attempted exact replications of 100 studies from
cognitive and social psychology. Ninety-seven of the
selected studies had reported significant effects. These
studies had been selected from three major psychology
journals. A different research team conducted each rep-
lication attempt. Only 36% of the attempted replications
were successful. Since then, results of numerous add-
itional replication projects have been published. In a
special issue of Social Psychology edited by Nosek and
Lakens (2014), 14 preregistered replication attempts
were reported, out of which eleven resulted in failure.
In the same special issue, the first of several Many
Labs Studies was published (Klein et al., 2014). In
Many Labs studies, several research groups attempt
CONTACT Wolfgang Stroebe wolfgang.stroebe@gmail.com Department of Social and Organizational Research, University of Groningen, Grote
Kruisstraat 2/1, 9712 TS, Groningen, the Netherlands.
 2019 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed,
or built upon in any way.
BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
2019, VOL. 41, NO. 2, 91–103
https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2019.1577736
the replication of either one particular study or a
whole set of studies. In the Many Labs 1 project,
36 research groups tried to replicate the same 13
effects with a total of 6,344 participants (Klein et al.,
2014). As in the other Many Labs studies of this type,
suitability for online presentation and brevity of study
were major criteria for the study selection. Ten of the
13 replication attempts were successful. In the Many
Labs 2 study, which is only now being published,
Klein and colleagues (2018) conducted replications of
28 contemporary published findings. The total set of
studies was divided into halves that could be run in
30 min. Each half was administered to half of 125
samples of more than 15,000 participants from 36
countries and territories. Fifteen (54%) of the studies
showed significant effects in the same direction as the
original finding. Because a major aim of both these
studies was to assess the variation across samples and
settings, Klein and colleagues compared the intraclass
correlations (ICC) of effects across samples with that
of samples across effects. As one would expect, the
ICC of effects across samples was quite large in both
studies, indicating that between 75% and 78% of the
variance was accounted by the different effects, leaving
approximately 20% of the variance to lab or sample
specific aspects such as potential effects of cultural
variation.1 That the ICC of samples across effects is
approximately zero in both Many Labs studies sug-
gests that “samples would elicit larger magnitudes for
some effects and smaller magnitudes for others”
(Klein et al., 2014, p. 149). This assumption is sup-
ported by the finding that tests of heterogeneity were
significant in 50% (Many Labs 1) and 39% (Many
Labs 2) of the studies.
The Many Labs 3 study was organized by Ebersole
et al. (2016) to replicate 10 known effects in 20 partici-
pant pools. Of these replication attempts, only three
were successful. A second aim of that study was to
detect effects of the time of the semester, when the study
was being run. These time effects were weak. A modified
Many Labs setup has been used by Schweinsberg et al.
(2016), in a study that became known as the Pipeline
Project, because 25 research groups conducted replica-
tions of up to 10 moral judgment studies, which one of
the coauthors of the Schweinsberg et al. project had con-
ducted but not yet published (i.e., in the pipeline).2 Each
of the groups attempted a direct replication of between
three and 10 of these studies. Six of the 10 effects repli-
cated robustly across all laboratories.
Camerer et al. (2018) set out to replicate 21 social
science experiments that had been published in
Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015. The
replication attempts were conducted by five teams
from the United States, Sweden, Singapore, and
Austria. Again deviating from the Many Labs design,
each team was responsible for only three to five repli-
cations. These researchers found significant effects in
the same direction as the original study for 12 replica-
tions (57.1%). After additional data collection to
increase statistical power, two more studies replicated
to bring the total to 14 (67%) successful replications.
In addition to these projects, there were also seven
preregistered replications published in Perspectives on
Psychological Science, of which six were replication
failures (Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Cheung et al.,
2016; Eerland et al., 2016; Hagger et al., 2016;
O’Donnell et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2016) and
only one was successful (Alogna et al., 2014). These
replication attempts used a different type of Many
Labs framework with all the labs attempting to repli-
cate one specific effect.
Given the enormous investment of time and resour-
ces in these replication attempts, the time may be ripe
to assess what we have learned from this research and
what can potentially be gained from these types of
projects (see also Strack, 2017; Strack & Stroebe, 2018;
Stroebe, 2016a). In this evaluation, I address four ques-
tions: First, to what extent do these replication studies
inform us about the replicability of social psychological
research? Second, can replications detect fraud and
have these projects helped us to uncover fraud cases?
Third, does the failure to replicate a study finding
indicate that the original finding was wrong? Finally,
do these replication attempts help to support or dis-
prove any social psychological theories?
Can replication studies assess the replicability
of social psychological research?
To assess the replicability of social psychological
research, a replication project would have to attempt
replications of a representative sample of social psy-
chological research. Obviously, this is an impossible
task, because it would have to include unpublished
research and unpublished research—even if it is
recent—is notoriously difficult to trace. But even if
one would limit such a sample to published research,
the numbers would be enormous, given that the first
social psychological studies have been published in
the decade before 1900 (Stroebe, 2012). Although it
would be feasible to create a representative sample of
research published during the last decade in journals
specifically devoted to social psychology, the numbers
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of studies to be replicated would still be exceed-
ingly large.
It is therefore not surprising that none of the Many
Labs studies made any attempt at sampling. The only
project that made such an attempt was the OSC
(2015). All effects were selected from one of three
journals: Psychological Science, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, and Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
Replication teams could select from a pool of the first
20 articles from each journal, starting with the first
article published in the first 2008 issue. Because most
articles publish multiple studies, the last experiment in
an article was selected for replication.
One can doubt whether articles from three prime
journals of the discipline are representative for psy-
chological research. The OSC claim that “the resulting
open data set provides an initial estimate of the repro-
ducibility of psychology” (pp. 4716-1) as well as their
title “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological
Science” considerably overstates their case. Even a
more modest title such as “Estimating the
Reproducibility of Psychological Research Published
in 2008 in Three Prime Journals” might be somewhat
of an overstatement. As Fiedler and Prager (2018)
criticized, the instruction to select the last study in
each article may have captured studies testing prob-
lematic and tangential hypotheses that were forced on
researchers by reviewers.
In contrast to the attempt of the OSC (2015) to
achieve some measure of representativeness, the Many
Labs projects clearly stated that their collection of
studies was in no way representative of social psycho-
logical research. For example, the studies in the Many
Labs 1 and 2 projects were selected so that they could
be easily run in a computer laboratory, and in one
session. Schweinsberg et al. (2016) in their pipeline
project attempted replications of studies on moral
judgment that had just been conducted by one of the
coauthors, certainly a very idiosyncratic selection cri-
terion. Their replication rates are therefore at best
representative for social psychological studies that are
suitable for online presentation and are quick to run.
With regard to the preregistered replications pub-
lished in Perspectives on Psychological Science, the
selection criteria are often that a study has received
many citations. However, this is not a particularly
valid selection criterion. For example, the Pen-Study
of Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) has been cited
703 times (Web of Science, October 1, 2018). Yet it is
only of historical interest. Even a failure of replicating
the pen-effects would not reduce our trust in the
facial feedback theory it originally tested. Similarly
questionable are the reasons for the selection of the
so-called Professor Study of Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg (1998). This study claimed to show that
priming student participants with the word professor
increased their performance on a Trivial Pursuit task.
Although this is an interesting effect, there has never
been a satisfactory theoretical explanation. Different
from other studies that suggest that category priming
can affect behavior such as walking speed (e.g., Bargh
et al., 1996), the professor priming influences per-
formance on a skill task (i.e., trivial pursuit).
Furthermore, the effect has frequently been replicated,
most recently in 2014 by Dijksterhuis, van
Knippenberg, and Holland (mentioned in
Dijksterhuis, 2018). They conducted an exact replica-
tion at the same university as the original study and
found the effect for male but not for female students.
The second and perhaps even more important
question is whether the failure to replicate a study
finding means that that particular study finding was
wrong. As I discuss this point extensively later, I only
briefly touch on two problems here. First, and this is
a problem specific to social psychology, operationali-
zations in social psychology often derive their mean-
ing from the historical, social or cultural context
(Crandall & Sherman, 2016; Stroebe & Strack, 2014).
Exact replications of a study, as they were attempted
in all replication projects, may fail to reflect the same
theoretical variables that were manipulated or meas-
ured in the original study. As a result, the failure of
an exact replication of a given study does not neces-
sarily imply that the theoretical hypothesis originally
tested in that study was refuted. Another potential
problem, which is also discussed later, is the possibil-
ity that even in attempts to conduct an exact replica-
tion of a study, experimenters might introduce
unintended deviations from the original procedure,
which will result in a failure to replicate the ori-
ginal findings.
What can we conclude from these replications proj-
ects? Although they do not permit inferences about
the replicability of (social-) psychological research in
general, they do suggest that our methodology could
profit from improvements. Social psychologists have
learned to take the complaints about the insufficient
statistical power of their research (e.g., Cohen, 1962;
Fraley & Vazire, 2014; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989)
more seriously and have considerably increased the
number of participants on which they base their stud-
ies. Most social psychology journals now require
power analyses and editors discourage studies that
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have less than .80 power.3 As another positive conse-
quence, researchers are now typically required to sub-
mit all experimental materials and all relevant data to
either the journal publishing their studies or some
publicly available server. This will considerably reduce
questionable research practices such as failing to pub-
lish relevant but inconsistent findings. It will also
facilitate the detection of fraud. Easy access to the ori-
ginal data of studies will also greatly facilitate meta-
analyses. Thus these replication projects have resulted
in changes in the way we do our research. However,
the publication of the OSC (2015) would probably
have sufficed to achieve this result. Social psycholo-
gists had learned their lesson and further multiple-lab
studies were not really required.
Can replication studies detect fraud?
It is a widely accepted myth in psychological science
that replications are useful in detecting fraud. For
example, Crocker and Cooper (2011, p. 1182) stated
in an editorial in a special section in Science on data
replication and reproducibility that “scientists gener-
ally trust that fabrication will be uncovered when
other scientists cannot replicate (and therefore valid-
ate) findings.” Along similar lines, Roediger (2012), a
former Association for Psychological Science presi-
dent, commented on the Stapel case that “if others
had tried to replicate his work soon after its publica-
tion, his misdeeds might have been uncovered much
more quickly” (para. 6). A study of the history of sci-
ence would have indicated that fraud is rarely detected
through failed replications (e.g., Broad & Wade, 1982;
Stroebe et al., 2012).
There are several reasons why replications do a
poor job as fraud detectors. There are typically so
many alternative explanations for replication failures
that fraud is not even considered. Science is based on
trust, and before the recent fraud cases, it would prob-
ably have not even occurred to scientists to suspect a
colleague of fraud. Based on information found on
the Internet, an analysis of 40 fraud cases observed
that in the overwhelming number of cases, colleagues
or students who became suspicious detected the fraud
(Stroebe et al., 2012). In only two, and two rather
unusual, cases was fraud discovered by replication fail-
ure. Even the Stapel fraud was revealed by his
research students, who had become suspicious of his
unusual success in empirically supporting the most
daring hypotheses (Stroebe et al., 2012). With the new
rule that data for published research have to be made
available, it can be expected that fraud cases will
increasingly be detected because of suspicious
data patterns.
Another reason for replications being poor fraud
detectors is that clever fraudsters, who stick closely to
predictions that are plausible in the light of existing
literature, have a very good chance that their research
will be successfully replicated by their colleagues.4 For
example, DeCoster and Claypool (2004) published a
meta-analysis of priming effects on impression forma-
tion supporting a general model of information bias.
The literature was very coherent and supportive of
their model. The only unexpected finding was that
effect sizes of studies conducted in Europe were sub-
stantially greater than those of American studies. They
attributed this to cultural differences. However, when
I checked the authorship of the European studies, it
turned out that the majority had been conducted by
Stapel, and many of these studies later turned out to
be fraudulent (Levelt et al., 2012). Thus, in inventing
data, Stapel managed to get the priming effects right
but overestimated the size of these effects.
Does replication failure falsify the
original finding?
The German Research Association (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2017) published a position
paper in which they made the obvious—but some-
times overlooked—point that the finding that a scien-
tific research result is replicable or not replicable is
itself a scientific finding and, as such, not final. Like
all scientific findings, it is subject to scientific skepti-
cism and further examination. More specifically, they
stated that “replication failure is no general proof of
falsification” (my translation). From reading some of
the Many Labs replication attempts, one gets the
impression that authors believe that by having a given
effect replicated by more than a dozen laboratories
from several continents and more than 1,000 research
participants, they can somehow identify the “true
effect” of a manipulation and thus arrive at conclu-
sions that are final.5
This is an illusion. There are both statistical and
methodological problems making it difficult to draw
clear-cut conclusions from replication studies. The
statistical problem is that there “is no single standard
for evaluating replication success” (OSC, 4716-2).
Because much has been written on this (e.g., Fiedler
& Prager, 2018; Trafimow, 2018), I limit my
discussion to the effect of regression shrinkage,
because it invalidates an apparently straightforward
and intuitively appealing criterion for evaluating
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replications: Replications are considered successful if
they show a statistically significant effect in the same
direction as the original study. As Trafimow (2018)
has recently pointed out, this is a poor decision criter-
ion. Like any statistic, p values have a sampling distri-
bution. Thus, if a researcher would exactly replicate
the same experiment multiple times, he or she would
get a distribution of p values. Without publication
bias, regression toward the mean would sometimes lift
the p value of a replication of a nonsignificant effect
above the threshold of significance and sometimes
lower the p value of the replication of an originally
significant effect below the significance level.
However, given the fact that only significant effects
are being published, it is likely that some of the
researchers of the original study were lucky and hit a
p value that was at the upper tail of the distribution.
As a consequence, regression effects are likely to have
lowered the p value of the replication. “Therefore, one
way to view the Open Science Collaboration finding is
that it provides empirical confirmation that psych-
ology results are not immune to statistical regression”
(Trafimow, 2018, p. 3).
Regression toward the mean also invalidates the
second indicator of replicability used by the OSC,
namely, their evaluation of the effect size of the repli-
cation against the original effect sizes. The OSC found
that of the 99 studies for which an effect size could be
computed for both the original and the replication
study, 82 showed a stronger effect size in the original
study. Again, this difference can be attributed to
regression toward the mean. Strong original effects are
likely to shrink when replicated (Fiedler & Prager,
2018). However, because—unlike with p values—there
is no (direct) pressure to publish only studies with
large effect sizes, regression toward the mean can also,
in cases of studies with relatively small effects, result
in replications to have larger effects than the original
study (Fiedler & Prager, 2018).
The methodological problem is that it is practically
impossible to conduct exact replications of the
original study. The aim of exact replications is to re-
create the manipulations and measures of the original
experiment as closely as possible. In trying to achieve
this, replicators are confronted with two problems.
The first problem is that descriptions of experimental
procedures in journal publications are typically not
very complete. For example, in attitude change experi-
ments, the messages used are rarely fully described,
leaving it to the replicator to create a communication
in line with the often scanty description given in the
original publication. Similarly, the instructions likely
are only paraphrased and the dependent measures are
not described in full, with only a few examples given
in illustration. A partial remedy here is to get in touch
with the original authors in the hopes that they did
keep a complete record. With experiments done in a
time before computers, such attempts are likely to be
unsuccessful.
The second problem, which is a major problem for
social psychological research, is that manipulations
and measures often derive their meaning from the
historical, social, and cultural context at a given time
(Crandall & Sherman, 2016; Gergen, 1973; Stroebe &
Strack, 2014). As a result, in a replication attempt of a
theory-testing study conducted many years after the
original study, the manipulation used in the original
study may no longer represent the theoretical con-
struct it reflected at that time. Similarly, the depend-
ent measure might no longer assess the theoretical
variable it measured originally. For this reason, many
researchers have argued that we should focus on con-
ceptual replications of theory-testing research and use
manipulations and measures that are more appropri-
ate in terms of the historical, social, and cultural con-
text in which the experiment is replicated (e.g.,
Crandall & Sherman, 2016; Stroebe & Strack, 2014).
A good illustration that historical or social change
can make a manipulation inappropriate is the classic
study by Aronson and Mills (1959) on the effects of
the severity of initiation on the liking of a group. This
study showed that female students, who had to
undergo a severe initiation to join a group (actually a
very dull discussion), liked the group more than
women, who had undergone a mild initiation. The
theoretical hypothesis, derived from dissonance the-
ory, was that undergoing a severe initiation to join
what turned out to be a dull group would create more
dissonance than having gone through only a mild ini-
tiation. The severity manipulation involved having to
either read aloud dirty words from a text or read neu-
tral words. I am not aware of any attempt at exactly
replicating this manipulation, but I would not expect
it to be successful. Whereas reading aloud dirty words
in front of a male experimenter might have been an
embarrassing experience for young women in 1959,
this is probably no longer the case today. Thus, an
exact replication of this study would be unlikely to
replicate the original findings even though a concep-
tual replication might do so.6
An early conceptual replication of this study was
conducted by Gerard and Mathewson (1966) to rule
out some alternative explanations of the original find-
ing. I report it here because it nicely illustrates the
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principle of conceptual replications. Instead of trying
to vary the theoretical variable “severity of initiation”
by having female students read dirty or neutral words,
the initiation consisted of experiencing either weak or
strong electric shocks. Thus this conceptual replication
used a totally different empirical manipulation to
manipulate the theoretical variable severity of initi-
ation. Consistent with the “suffering leads to liking
hypothesis,” students who had to suffer the strong
shocks liked the discussion groups more than did stu-
dents, who experience only mild shocks. As with all
conceptual replications, it can be argued that giving
electric shocks might not constitute the same type of
initiation as having female students read out dirty
words. It should be pointed out, however, that any
manipulation in any theory-testing experiment relies
on auxiliary hypotheses that can be criticized for fail-
ure to truly reflect the theoretical variable it is sup-
posed to vary (Trafimow, 2012). This is one the
reasons for the rejection of “naïve falsificationism,”
that is, the assumption that a single inconsistent find-
ing can falsify a theory (Popper, 1959).
That changes in the social context might have
affected findings of the OSC (2015) has been sug-
gested by van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, and
Reinero (2016). These researchers had the OSC stud-
ies rated in terms of contextual sensitivity, that is, the
extent to which the research topic in each study was
deemed by raters to be contextually sensitive. Success
of replication attempt correlated negatively with con-
textual sensitivity (r = .23), an association that
remained significant even after controlling for effect
size and statistical power. This could be an indication
that some of the replication failures might have been
due to the impact of historical change and a failure of
manipulations or measures to reflect the original the-
oretical constructs. Although Inbar (2016) criticized
the interpretation of van Bavel et al. pointing out that
the association between contextual sensitivity and rep-
licability becomes nonsignificant if one controls for
discipline (i.e., cognitive vs. social psychology), this
could be the result of a restriction in range:
Contextual sensitivity is a problem specific to social
psychology (Gergen, 1973).
In another comment on the OSC (2015), Gilbert,
King, Pettigrew, and Wilson (2016) criticized that
some replications used participant populations that
differed from those used in the original study. This
can be a problem even if an apparently identical
American student population is used, because students
today are likely to differ in many ways from those
who were studied 20 years ago. It becomes even more
problematic, when a study originally conducted with
American students is replicated in another country or
with nonstudents. Gilbert et al. mentioned that an ori-
ginal study that measured American attitudes toward
African Americans (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008)
was replicated with Italian students, who were unlikely
to share the same stereotypes. Similarly, a study by
Risen and Gilovich (2008) that asked college students
to imagine being called by a professor was replicated
with individuals who had never been to college.
Gilbert et al. further criticized that some replication
attempts used procedures that differed in substantial
ways from the protocol of the original study and thus
failed to exactly replicate that study. The most striking
example was the replication of a study that asked
Israelis to imagine the consequences of military ser-
vice (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) and asked Americans
to imagine the consequences of a honeymoon. Such
deviations may be necessary when a conceptual repli-
cation is considered more appropriate than an exact
replication. But there is no reason why an exact repli-
cation could not have been conducted with Israeli
participants.
Although the critique of Gilbert et al. (2016) is per-
suasive, it suffers from the weakness that they cannot
demonstrate that the original findings would have
been replicated had the original procedures been fol-
lowed with the proper subject populations. In the
meantime, there are studies that have done so, albeit
not with OSC experiments. One example is the repli-
cation by Luttrell, Petty, and Xu (2017) of a failed
replication attempt by the Many Labs 3 project
(Ebersole et al., 2016) of a study by Cacioppo, Petty,
and Morris (1983). Cacioppo et al. tested a prediction
of the elaboration likelihood model (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986) about the effects of differences in
Need for Cognition (NFC) on persuasion. People with
high need for cognition enjoy engaging in cognitive
activity and are assumed to scrutinize message con-
tents to a greater extent than people with low need
for cognition. According to the ELM, they should
therefore be more influenced by the quality of the
arguments presented in a communication. This
hypothesis was experimentally supported by Cacioppo
et al. in a study in which they manipulated argument
quality and measured NFC. In contrast, an attempt at
exactly replicating this study in the Many Labs 3 pro-
ject (Ebersole et al. 2016) failed to find the expected
interaction between NFC and argument quality
on persuasion.
In their comments on the Many Labs 3 replication
failure, Petty and Cacioppo (2016) pointed at several
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discrepancies between the original study and the repli-
cation. Because the original communications were no
longer available, Ebersole et al. (2016) had to re-create
those messages. According to Petty and Cacioppo
(2016), the new communications were unusually
short. More important, different from the original
study, participants in the Ebersole et al. (2016) study
were also told that the change in examination proced-
ure announced in the message would shortly be intro-
duced at their own university. This instruction is
known to increase processing motivation (e.g., Petty,
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) and thus likely to elim-
inate the motivational differences due to measured
NFC. When Luttrell et al. (2016) replicated the study,
comparing the suboptimal condition (short message,
high processing motivation) of Ebersole et al. (2016)
with an optimal condition (longer message, low proc-
essing motivation) supposedly used in the original
study, they found a third-order interaction (Condition
 Argument Quality  NFC). They replicated the
NFC  Argument Quality interaction in the optimal
condition (i.e., longer message, low processing motiv-
ation) but not in the suboptimal condition used by
Ebersole et al. (2016).
But the story does not end on this happy note.
Ebersole et al. (2017) attempted to replicate the
Luttrell et al. (2016) study in nine laboratories with
1,219 participants using the Luttrell et al. materials.
They failed to replicate the third-order interaction of
Luttrell et al. (2016). However, they found a signifi-
cant second order interaction (NFC x Argument
Quality) in the optimal condition, but not in the sub-
optimal condition. Although they replicated the ori-
ginal effect of Cacioppo et al. (1983) in the optimal
condition, they could not reliably establish that the
effects of the two experimental manipulations differed.
But since the original question was whether the
Cacioppo et al. (1983) findings could be replicated,
the fact that Ebersole et al. (2017) have now replicated
it, might deter future replicators from pursuing this
issue any further.
Another example of a failed replication—the
attempt by Wagenmakers et al. (2016) to replicate the
so-called Pen-Study of Strack, Martin, and Stepper
(1988)—illustrates that exact replications can become
inexact when experimenters try to improve on the ori-
ginal procedure. The Pen-Study of Strack et al. was a
test of the facial feedback hypothesis. This hypothesis,
originally proposed by Darwin (1872), suggests that
certain facial expressions and postures exert an influ-
ence on emotional responses. Research on this theory
had originally been hampered by the difficulty of
manipulating facial expressions unobtrusively. The
innovative contribution of Strack and colleagues
(1989) was to suggest a method by which frowns and
smiles could be induced without giving specific
instructions about facial muscles. Holding a pen with
one’s teeth forces facial muscles into a smiling pos-
ition, whereas holding it with one’s lips inhibits smil-
ing. The dependent measure in this study was ratings
of the funniness of moderately funny cartoons. In
support of the facial feedback hypothesis, participants
reported more intense humor when cartoons were
presented under conditions that facilitated smiling
rather than inhibiting it. Although important at the
time as the first strict test of the facial feedback
hypothesis, the study is only of historical importance
today because the facial feedback hypothesis is well
supported by a multitude of psychological and neuro-
logical data: The manipulation of facial expressions
has been shown to affect emotional responses as well
as prefrontal activation in the amygdala (Price &
Harmon-Jones, 2015). A recent study demonstrated
even that the two ways of holding the pen were asso-
ciated with different fMRI fluctuation in areas related
to the initiation of positive emotions (Chang et al,
2014; see also Hennenlotter et al., 2009).
Given that multiple successful conceptual replica-
tions of the Pen-Study had already been published,7 it
came as a surprise that the 17 laboratories from eight
countries failed to find an effect of the pen manipula-
tion on ratings of the funniness of cartoons
(Wagenmakers et al., 2016). However, on closer read-
ing of the publication, the reason for this failure
became apparent (Strack, 2016; Stroebe, 2016b). In
their pursuit of “true effects,” Wagenmakers and col-
leagues had decided to videotape participants during
the experiment to make sure that they followed
instructions. This would have been no problem had
they used hidden cameras. But participants were told
that they would be videotaped and had the camera in
full sight. As Strack (2016) pointed out in his reflec-
tions on the Wagenmakers et al. (2016) study, this
might have been responsible for the failure of the pen
manipulation having an effect. Independently, I
wrote in a blog in the Digital Newspaper of
Utrecht University,
I could image that they might have felt a bit strange
sitting in a laboratory with a pen in their mouths
rating cartoons. Most participants will probably have
been concerned about looking rather silly. It is easily
imaginable that these concerns will have drowned the
subtle cues emanating from their facial muscles.
(Stroebe, 2016b, para. 11)
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It is surprising that none of the 17 researchers
involved in the replication attempt objected to this
change in the original procedure.
In the meantime, there is evidence to suggest that
the cameras were indeed responsible for the replica-
tion failure. Noah, Schul, and Mayo (2018) recently
published a further replication of the study, in which
they implemented the pen manipulation under two
conditions, one with a video camera and one without.
Whereas the condition without a camera replicated
the original effect of Strack et al. (1988), the insertion
of a camera eliminated the effect and thus replicated
the null-finding of Wagenmakers et al. (2016).
Even more recently, a further successful replication
of the original effect has been published (Marsh,
Rhoads, & Ryan, 2018). These authors used a class-
room demonstration to replicate the original Pen-
Study with 446 male and female students. Students
were divided into two groups on the basis of their
seating position in the classroom. Students on the
right side of the room were instructed to hold the pen
in their teeth, whereas students on the left side were
instructed to hold it in their lips. While holding the
pens in their mouths, students were shown cartoons
via overhead projector and were asked to rate how
funny these cartoons were. They were then asked to
switch the pen to the other position and were shown
a new set of cartoons they had to evaluate. Thus, the
pen effect was tested in both a within-subjects and a
between-subjects design. The mean difference between
the cartoon ratings under the two conditions was
highly significant.
The problematic replication studies discussed ear-
lier illustrate the point made by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (2017) that replications—
even if they are as massive as the OSC or the Many
Labs studies—cannot provide definitive answers.
However, it is not my intention to imply that social
psychological study findings cannot be effectively falsi-
fied. In fact, the Many Labs framework could be well
suited for testing whether published research findings
can be replicated. If several laboratories, following the
same protocol, fail to replicate an earlier finding, it is
probable that this finding is false (Earp & Trafimow,
2015). However, the likelihood that a finding is false
depends not only on the power of the replication
attempt but also on the quality of the experimental
protocol. If the experimental procedure followed in
the replication attempt is suboptimal, either because it
does not represent an exact replication (if an exact
replication is intended) or because a conceptual repli-
cation would have been more appropriate, then even
the results of powerful Many Labs studies have to
be doubted.
Following the same protocol can also become a
weakness, at least with manipulations or measures
that are culturally sensitive, if the research groups
involved in that replication attempt come from differ-
ent cultural contexts. It is probably out of misguided
ideas about external validity (see Stroebe, Gadenne, &
Nijstad, 2018) that most of these Many Labs projects
have involved research groups from a variety of coun-
tries. For example, O’Donnell et al. (2018), who
attempted to replicate the effect reported by
Dijkterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) that priming
students with the word professor increased their per-
formance on a Trivial Pursuit task, proudly reported
that “the participating labs represent five continents
and 19 countries” (p. 272). The problem here is not
the fact that theories are tested in several countries
but that an experimental manipulation or measure
that has been developed in one country may not
reflect the intended theoretical constructs when used
in a different cultural context. The fact that the know-
ledge items—used as dependent measure by all
research groups in the O’Donnell et al. replication—
had been standardized with an undergraduate student
sample of the University of California at Berkeley con-
stitutes a methodological problem. As Dijksterhuis
(2018) pointed out in his comments on the replica-
tion, “this obviously made for a less sensitive depend-
ent variable than would have been possible with a
tailor-made set of questions pilot-tested by the indi-
vidual labs” (p. 296). Some other replication attempts
suffer from the same problem. For example,
Wagenmakers et al. (2016) used cartoons as depend-
ent measure that had been pretested with Dutch stu-
dents from the University of Amsterdam. It is hardly
likely that students in other countries, who partici-
pated in this study, had the same sense of humor as
these Dutch students.
Even if a Many Labs replication would unequivo-
cally suggest that a particular effect that had been pro-
duced in the original experiment could not be
reproduced, this finding would per se not be particu-
larly informative. In theory-testing research, we are
interested in manipulations and measures only to the
extent that they inform us about the validity of the
theory being tested. For example, the phenomenon
that holding a pen between the lips rather than with
one’s teeth affects a person’s evaluation of the funni-
ness of cartoons is important only because it supports
the facial feedback hypothesis. It has no other pur-
pose. Because the facial feedback hypothesis has in the
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meantime been supported by numerous much stron-
ger studies (i.e., studies that used better manipulations
of facial muscles and better measures of affective
responses), nonreplication of the Pen Study would
hardly reduce our trust in the validity of the facial
feedback hypothesis. Thus, evidence that a particular
effect does not exist is informative only because of its
relevance for the theory that predicted that effect.
And this relevance might decrease with the availability
of better methods of testing that theory.
Can failure to replicate a single finding falsify
a theory?
A theory consists of abstract and unobservable con-
structs and assumptions about the relationship
between these constructs. To test the theory empiric-
ally, these unobservable theoretical constructs have to
be operationalized, that is, translated into observable
terms with empirical hypotheses. The assumptions
that link unobservable theoretical constructs to empir-
ical manipulations or measures are “auxiliary hypoth-
eses” that can themselves be true or false (Gadenne,
1984; Trafimow, 2012). For example, the unobservable
theoretical construct of NFC has been translated into
an empirically measurable construct through the
development of the NFC questionnaire (Cacioppo
et al., 1983). The theoretical construct of argument
quality has been operationalized through sets of argu-
ments that have been evaluated as high or low quality
in a pretest. Finally, the unobservable theoretical con-
cept of persuasion has been translated into an empir-
ically measurable construct through an attitude scale
(Trafimow, 2012).
Unfortunately, there is always the possibility that
researchers’ auxiliary hypotheses are invalid (Gadenne
1984; Popper, 1959; Trafimow, 2012). For example,
the NFC scale might have low reliability or validity,
the piloting of argument quality might have been
done with high school rather than university students,
and the measure of persuasion might have been unre-
liable. Most important, however, due to cultural,
social, or historical change, the empirical realization
of a theoretical construct in the original study may
have no longer reflected this theoretical construct in a
replication attempt conducted decades later (Stroebe
& Strack, 2014).
This is one of the reasons why there can be no cru-
cial experiments that can determine the fate of a the-
ory. According to Popper’s (1959) methodological
falsificationist position, theories are only falsified by
multiple negative results and/or an alternative theory
of greater empirical content.8 Theories have to be
evaluated with research programs that consist of whole
sequences of studies that assess the validity of hypoth-
eses derived from a given theory. The purpose of
every single study in that program is to test whether a
given finding is consistent or inconsistent with the
theory tested. A positive outcome of a theory-testing
experiment will increase our trust in that theory,
whereas a negative outcome will decrease it. Thus,
each outcome is a small building block that contrib-
utes to our knowledge of the phenomenon under
study (see Earp & Trafimow, 2015, for a formalization
of this process). Although we can never hope to prove
that a theory is valid, the aim of a research program
involving such a sequence of theory-testing studies is
to leave us either with a great deal of trust in the val-
idity of that theory or with the conviction that the
theory is untenable, at least in its present form.
This raises the question about the purpose of these
multiple attempts at mass replication of unsystematic-
ally selected studies. Even if a Many Labs replication
would unequivocally suggest that a particular effect
that had been produced in the original experiment
could not be reproduced, this finding would merely
reduce our trust in that theory (assuming that the the-
ory was otherwise well supported) but not result in its
falsification. But the knowledge is in the theories and
not the effects being studied. The finding that the way
one holds a pen in one’s mouth influences ratings of
the funniness of cartoons is per se a totally useless bit
of knowledge.9 Thus, if one wanted to evaluate the
state of social psychology as a science, one had to
assess the validity of social psychological theories and
not of social psychological findings.
Conclusions
To assess the state of social psychological science, one
has to evaluate the validity of social psychological the-
ories, because the body of knowledge of a science is
in its theories and not its effects. Exceptions are
applied sciences where applications become important.
For example, if medical theories make the prediction
that a particular drug would be helpful in treating a
disease, there will be a long sequence of drug tests to
establish the effectiveness of that drug. Here multiple
drug trials are essential to make sure that a drug really
works. But these studies are typically not theory-
testing but assessing whether a particular intervention
has the expected effect. Social psychology has also
multiple applications such as health, organizational, or
consumer psychology, where repeated assessments of
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the effectiveness of applications are important.
However, in evaluating social psychological science—
the aim of practically all of these replication
attempts—the concern should be with the validity of
our theories rather than that of unsystematically
selected research findings.
According to Popper (1959), theories cannot be
proven to be true. Although we can increase our trust
in the validity of a theory by conducting strict tests of
that theory, there will never be complete certainty that
a theory is valid. Theories can also not be falsified by
single experiments. They have to be evaluated by
research programs that assess the validity of multiple
hypotheses that can typically be derived from a the-
ory. Therefore, the attempt to replicate single unsys-
tematically selected psychological effects does not
allow general statements about the validity of the the-
ories that were originally tested with these studies.
Given the additional problem that the outcomes of
replication attempts are themselves scientific findings
and open to skepticism, their contribution to social
psychological knowledge is extremely limited. One can
therefore question whether the knowledge they add
justifies the immense investment in time and resour-
ces that have been expended by the various multilab
studies. Although it is possible to evaluate theories by
replicating studies, one would have to systematically
select sets of studies that provide the central evidence
for a given theory. An alternative procedure would be
to assess the overall predictive validity of that theory
through meta-analysis. However, the optimal strategy,
and one that would result in the greatest gain in
knowledge, would be to develop and test a better the-
ory that has greater empirical content.
Notes
1. Because all studies were conducted at the same time,
one would not expect effects due to changes in
historical context. Changes in historical context should
result in replication failures. The fact that the
participants in these studies had access to (or
familiarity with) computers should have reduced the
likelihood of cultural variations.
2. I must admit that the purpose of this exercise was not
totally clear to me. Making this a prerequisite of any
empirical publication would be a rather cumbersome
requirement.
3. For example, the author instructions of the Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology state, “Each original
empirical study with existing data should report, for
its key hypothesis tests, a sensitivity power analysis. …
This should assume an alpha significance criterion
(normally .05, two-tailed), and a standard power




4. If Stapel had kept to this recipe and not become
overconfident in his later research, his fraud might
never have been detected.
5. Pashler and DeRuiter (2017) suggested that “all
reviews of summaries produced by psychological
scientists … need to explicitly and conservatively label
the degree of support. The highest credibility
category—call it ‘Class 1’—must be reserved for
findings that have been confirmed in one or more
preregistered replications, where publication bias,
HARking (hypothesizing after the results are known),
and p-hacking can all be confidently excluded.”
6. To support this argument empirically, one would have
to replicate the original embarrassment manipulation
and demonstrate with a manipulation check that it
does not result in significant differences in
embarrassment in the replication study. As Erdfelder
and Ulrich (2018) argued correctly, “An exact
replication can be questioned only, if .. it can be
demonstrated that the experimental material at the
time and place of the replication study fails to have
the same psychological effect as at the time of the
original study” (pp. 6–7, my translation). Although
Aronson and Mills (1959) did not report a
manipulation check, they assumed that their
manipulation had a differential effect on
embarrassment.
7. A list of the studies can be retrieved
from https://www.dropbox.com/s/5ttmh4swuhwgs17/
Literature.xlsx?dl=0.
8. A theory B is said to have greater empirical content
than a theory A if it can (a) explain all the findings
supportive of A, (b) explain the findings that are
nonsupportive of A and (3) make some new
predictions that cannot be derived from A.
9. This is often used by journalists to ridicule social
psychology. For example, if one describes the Pen-
Study without mentioning that is was conducted to
test an important theoretical hypothesis, it appears a
useless—even inane—exercise.
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